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Abstract. The safety of radio electronic systems for critical applications is traditionally ensured by inducing structural redundancy. This paper shows 
a developed technique for ensuring a required level of safety of such systems by inducing time and functional redundancy into its behavior algorithm. 
The defined safety characteristic is proposed for quantitative efficiency estimation of the induced redundancy. Presented in the article is the synthesis 
technique of safe behavior algorithms on the basis of safety characteristic minimization of increased values. The developed technique was tested through 
solving the synthesis problem of the behavior algorithm of the target detection radio electronic complex system. 
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SYNTEZA ALGORYTMÓW BEZPIECZNEGO POSTĘPOWANIA W SYSTEMACH 
RADIOELEKTRONICZNYCH DO ZASTOSOWAŃ W SYTUACJACH KRYTYCZNYCH 
Streszczenie. Bezpieczeństwo radiowych systemów elektronicznych używanych w sytuacjach krytycznych jest tradycyjnie zapewnione przez wprowadzenie 
redundancji strukturalnej. W pracy zaproponowano sposób zapewnienia określonego poziomu bezpieczeństwa radiowych systemów elektronicznych 
poprzez wprowadzenie redundancji czasowej i funkcjonalnej do algorytmu postępowania. Aby zmierzyć wydajność wprowadzonej redundancji, 
zaproponowano określone cechy bezpieczeństwa. Artykuł przedstawia metodę syntezy algorytmów bezpiecznego postępowania na podstawie minimalizacji 
wzrostu wartości określonych cech bezpieczeństwa. Opracowana metoda została przetestowana podczas rozwiązywania problemu syntezy algorytmu 
postępowania dla złożonego systemu radioelektronicznego przeznaczonego do wykrywania celów. 
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo, inżynieria bezpieczeństwa, algorytm postępowania, projekt systemu 
Introduction 
This paper represents a problem of behavior algorithm design 
which is developed for a radio-electronic system and should 
provide a high level of functional safety. The radio electronic 
system, as a part of a complex technical system, performs a task of 
organizing control actions. As an example of such complex 
technical system there can be mentioned a nuclear power plant, 
and a radio electronic system as its information driven system [8]. 
The exploitation safety of a complex technical system depends 
on several factors which include the functional safety and 
reliability of the radio electronic system [9]. That is why we use in 
this paper the definition “radio electronic system for critical 
applications” – RESCA. 
An effect of the disability of a complex technical system is an 
emergency, and one of the reasons of failure is a non-execution of 
the RESCA task. 
Therefore, the RESCA is designed as hardware and software 
system with fault tolerance structure [6, 11]. It consists of different 
subsystems and each of them performs its objective function. A 
spare subsystem should be provided for each subsystem to ensure 
the fault tolerance of the RESCA. The spare subsystem performs 
its function in a different way than the main one. 
The safety of the RESCA is determined by its fault-tolerant 
structure and robust behavior, as well as its functional behavior [5, 
10]. Functional behavior is defined by an algorithm that specifies 
the conditions and sequence of actions performed by the RESCA 
subsystems and modules when performing its functions. The 
behavior algorithm (BA) is being developed at the stage of the 
RESCA system design [1, 14]. Synthesis methods of different 
types of algorithms are discussed in details in monographs [3, 7, 
12]. However, the synthesis problem concerning safe algorithms 
in these works is not solved. 
There are more peculiarities of the RESCA behavior 
algorithms– they are characterized both by a successful and an 
unsuccessful execution [16]. Examples of such BAs are 
algorithms of target searching and detection, algorithms of 
receiving, recording and transmitting telemetry data, algorithms of 
obtaining navigation data, and others. An unsuccessful execution 
of such BAs leads to emergencies.  
Failures of BA performance are caused by operator errors, 
hardware and software faults, inaccurate input data, a malfunction 
of control and diagnostics, etc. To minimize the number of 
unsuccessful executions of the RESCA and, accordingly, to ensure 
the required level of exploitation safety, the RESCA is provided 
with some means of time [2] and functional redundancy [15]. 
Verification of the feasibility of inducing each type of 
redundancy should take place at the stage of the RESCA system 
design. A lack of such ability in modern design means forced 
safety testing only at the testing stage of a complex technical 
system [13]. However, such approach is not always acceptable due 
to presence of errors in the RESCA behavior algorithm, when the 
complex technical system falls into an emergency. Such cases can 
be often seen in recent years after the launches of Soyuz rocket 
with spacecraft Progress (2011, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018), SpaceX 
spacecraft Dragon (2015), military missiles Bulava (2017) and 
Burevestnik (2019). The main reason, for almost all emergencies, 
were errors in the BA of the launcher units, control systems, 
navigation systems. And it is important to detect these errors at the 
system design stage. Fortunately, these accidents happened only 
with the cargo spacecrafts. 
Nevertheless, all consequences of such accidents can be very 
significant – these are a potential death of the crew, a 
contamination of large areas with hazardous substances (rocket 
fuel, radioactive substances etc.), a risk of potential fall of 
explosive objects on residential buildings, etc. 
Therefore, a lot of attention should be paid to the problem of 
synthesizing the safe behavior algorithms of the RESCA. For 
qualitative solving of such a problem, it is necessary to operate 
tools (models, methods, techniques and software) which 
adequately take into account all the features of the behavior 
algorithm of the RESCA. So, all of it allows to carry out the 
synthesis of BA via multivariate analysis for short period of time. 
It should be noted that in order to confirm the accuracy of the 
obtained results at the stage of system design, it is necessary to 
operate not one, but two methods (or more) of solving the problem 
of BA analysis, since fulfilled reliability simulation results will 
allow to reduce the volume and, accordingly, the development 
cost of the RESCA field tests. 
1. Problem statement 
In order to provide a required level of safety for the RESCA 
exploitation, it is necessary to minimize the probability of failure 
of its behavior algorithm (unsuccessful execution). This necessity 
demands the re-execution of critical functions in case of hardware 
failures, software malfunctions, or operator errors. The re-
execution of certain functions within the execution time period of 
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the BA requires a time redundancy, which implies the re-
execution of some set of the BA operational blocks [2]. 
Accordingly, additional cycles are induced in the BA, which 
should contain blocks for checking stochastic and deterministic 
conditions [16]. In the case of a stochastic condition, it is not 
possible to predict in advance how many times the cycle will be 
executed and, accordingly, the duration of the cycle. If the 
execution of a certain function in certain conditions does not lead 
to a positive result, then the BA should provide the possibility of 
transferring the execution of mentioned function from one 
subsystem to the other, which performs this function in a different 
way. It means that the successful execution of the BA is ensured 
by functional redundancy. 
A characteristic feature of the RESCA is the limit value of the 
duration of each BA objective function. If this value exceeds the 
allowable maximum, the algorithm fails to complete its operation 
and the RESCA falls into a critical failure. Thus, the induction of 
time redundancy in the BA may not be acceptable by certain 
requirements of the duration. To minimize the probability of 
unsuccessful execution of the BA, and accordingly, an emergency 
of a complex technical system, it is necessary to determine the 
maximum number of repetitions of each cycle. 
Switching to another operating block means switching the 
function execution to another RESCA subsystem, which performs 
this function in another way. If, after several repetitive cycles the 
RESCA fails to complete the task and the average cycle time 
exceeded the limit, then switching to another RESCA subsystem 
is done. If this subsystem is not able to perform its function, it 
switches to the next one. If all the functions provided in the AP are 
completed, then we have a successful execution. Otherwise, we 
have an unsuccessful execution so, accordingly, the complex 
technical system falls into an emergency.  
Checking the induction efficiency of each of the redundancy 
varieties should be done at the stage of the RESCA system design 
and the following questions should be answered: 
 for which BA functions should a repeatable cycle be induced? 
 how many times should each cycle be executed? 
 will the average duration of the behavior algorithm exceed the 
limit value? 
 should another RESCA subsystem to perform a non-executed 
function be switched to? 
 how will the induction of redundancy impact the safety of the 
RESCA exploitation? 
Therefore, at the system design stage, designers should have 
some set of models, methods and techniques that will provide the 
efficiency estimation of the RESCA, depending on the tactical and 
technical characteristics of hardware, indexes of reliability, 
different number of repeatable cycles of behavior algorithm, an 
operator’s reaction rate, etc. 
2. Method of synthesis of safe behavior algorithms 
As it was mentioned above, for the synthesis of the safe BA, it 
is necessary to induce time and functional redundancies, and to 
determine their effect on the performance of the algorithm, since 
the efficiency and safety indexes of the BA are closely linked. 
This is explained by the fact that during unsuccessful completion, 
the BA includes successful executions and unsuccessful 
executions (emergency states). 
Let’s consider a model of all possible options for the 
implementation of BA while the RESCA operation is in the form 
of a graph of states and transitions. To do this, one has to assume 
that the RESCA is supposedly monitored, and the same BA is run 
many times. As a result of the BA execution, the RESCA gets into 
different states. States of current execution are defined by 
determined factors that operate the BA execution process (number 
of operating blocks, duration of operation, number of cycles, 
number of paths, etc.), and the states of successful execution and 
the emergency states are determined by random factors that lead to 
the failure (failure of subsystems, operator errors) or stoppage of 
the BA (average duration (Tavg) of BA exceeds the limit value of 
duration (Tlim), external interference, etc.). 
Thus, there are three groups of states: 
 the states from the first group reflect the process of transition 
from one operating unit of the BA to another in the process of 
performing the objective function; 
 the states from the second group are the successful completion 
of the BA; 
 the states from the third group are the unsuccessful completion 
of the BA. 
2.1. Characteristics of behavior algorithm 
exploitation safety 
As a result of the execution of the behavior algorithm, the 
RESCA is in the first group of states for a certain period of time, 
the average value of which (Tavg) should not exceed the limit of 
the execution duration (Tlim) of the objective function. Then, 
depending on the external and internal factors, the RESCA 
changes its state to the second group or to the third group. If the 
RESCA stays in the first group of states over the limit value (Tlim), 
it cannot perform its task and the complex technical system falls 
into an emergency. If, under the Tavg ≤ Tlim, the RESCA enters the 
second group of states, and it completes successfully its objective 
function. If the RESCA falls into the third group of states, there 
are two consequences for them: 
 for t ≤ Tlim, the RESCA can return to the first group of states 
as a result of re-execution of some part of the AP. Moreover, 
there are several transmissions into the third group of states 
from the first state group and back. 
 for t > Tlim, the RESCA remains in the third state group 
because the BA falls into the state of unsuccessful execution 
of the task, so the RESCA causes no emergency at all. 
The changes of the RESCA state to the first and the second 
groups are characterized by the probability of successful execution 
of the BA – Psp(t). This is the probability that the RESCA 
completes its task as a result of the execution of the BA. This 
probability is the sum of probabilities of being in k states of 
successful execution – Pj(t): 
 𝑃𝑠𝑝(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 (𝑡), (1) 
The changes of the RESCA state to the third state group 
characterized by the probability of unsuccessful (emergency) 
execution of the BA – Q(t). This is the probability of an 
unsuccessful completion of the BA, so as a result RESCA does 
not perform its task. 
 𝑄(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑣
𝑖=𝑞 (𝑡),   (2) 
where q, …, v – numbers of unsuccessful execution states. 
However, the probability of unsuccessful completion of the 
task is an integral characteristic of the BA and does not allow to 
estimate how many times during Tavg time the RESCA falls into 
emergency state. Therefore, we propose to define a new feature of 
BA exploitation safety – frequency of falling into the emergency 
state: 
 𝑤(𝑡) =
𝑑𝑄(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= ∑ 𝜆𝑧,𝑧−𝑞 ∙ 𝑃𝑧−𝑞(𝑡)
𝑧−1
𝑞=0 , (3) 
where λz,z-q – intensity of transition to the z state of unsuccessful 
execution of the BA from the z-q state, 
Pz-q(t) – the probability that the RESCA stays in the z-q state, 
Q(t) – the probability that the RESCA gets in critical failure state. 
Obtained characteristics of BA exploitation safety have the 
following variants (Fig. 1). 
If the RESCA does not have functional and structural 
redundancy, then the maximum of the safety characteristic w (t) 
will be at time t = 0 and the characteristic will decrease 
exponentially. 
When redundancy is presented then frequency of falling into 
emergency state w(t) at time t = 0 can take the value ≥ 0 and 
further increase to some maximum value, and later decrease 
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exponentially to zero. The more redundancy (temporal and / or 
functional) is induced into the BA, the lower is the value of the 
w(t) maximum and the further to the right it moves. In other 
words, with an increase of redundancy, the frequency of falling 
into an emergency state decreases.  
 
Fig. 1. Characteristics of BA exploitation safety 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between safety characteristics 
and the RESCA efficiency. 
 
Fig. 2. Relationship between safety characteristics and the RESCA efficiency 
Thus, the essence of the procedure for the synthesis of safe 
behavior algorithms for the RESCA is to minimize the maximum 
value of the frequency of falling into emergency state under the 
following restrictive conditions: 
 a minimum permissible threshold for the probability of 
successful execution of the BA – Рlim(t), 
 a limited value of probability of unsuccessful execution 
of BA – Q(t), 
 a limited value of the permissible average value of the 
execution duration of the BA – Тlim.  
2.2. Technique of safe behavior algorithm synthesis 
The technique of safe behavior algorithm synthesis consists of 
a set of methods and models presented by the scheme in Fig. 3. 
This technique consists of nine stages. Its essence is that at the 
first stage time redundancy is heuristically introduced into critical 
function of the BA of the RESCA to achieve successful 
completion. Practically its use is realized in a cyclic re-execution 
of certain operating blocks (functions). Such cycles of repetition 
of certain functions in the AP can be several dozens. Moreover, 
there is a certain contradiction: on the one hand it is impossible to 
determine the required number of repetitions, and on the other 
hand it is impossible to allow a loop on a certain function (causes 
too long cycle duration). If, after a certain number of repetitions, 
the subsystem is unable to complete the task, then its task is 
performed with some probability of successful execution by 
another subsystem, if it is possible. This case induces functional 
redundancy.  
Functional redundancy is displayed in the BA by the induction 
of stochastic check blocks. If, under certain conditions of 
application, the BA with the induction of time and functional 
redundancy in the RESCA cannot complete the task with a given 
probability for a given time, the BA fails. Thus, in the first step, 
additional re-execution cycles (time redundancy) and stochastic 
checking blocks of functional redundancy need to be induced in 
the initial version of the RESCA behavior algorithm to provide a 
given level of safety for the RESCA exploitation. As a result, we 
get a new version of the BA for which it is necessary to select the 
parameters of time and functional redundancy, and operating 
modes of equipment and hardware to provide the necessary value 
of probability of execution and the average value of the execution 
duration of the RESCA task. 
 
Fig. 3. Flowchart of the method of safe behavior algorithms synthesis 
The second and the third steps of the technique provide a 
representation of the BA model in the form of a graph of states 
and transitions. An effective tool for such representation is 
improved space state method [4]. This method allows to obtain a 
complete state space, which includes all three of the mentioned 
above groups of states, it gives an ability to adequately reflect all 
variants of application of the RESCA behavior algorithm during 
the task execution. 
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In the second stage it is necessary to develop a structural-
automatic model (SAM) [4] of the behavior algorithm. The 
peculiarity of such SAM is the presence of two types of check 
blocks (stochastic and deterministic) and one base event – the 
current execution of the operating block. At the third stage the 
model is automatically built in the form of a graph of states and 
transitions using the ASNA software [17]. 
At the fourth stage, an analytical model is formed in the form 
of Kolmogorov – Chapman differential equation system. This 
equation system is formed automatically using ASNA software. 
The solution of the differential equation system in the fifth stage 
will result in the distribution of probabilities of being in each state. 
From the resulting distribution, formulas are composed to 
determine the efficiency indexes of the BA as the sum of the 
probabilities of being in the respective states (the sixth step).  
The obtained indexes depend on the parameters of the BA (the 
probability of performing the RESCA subsystems function, the 
average performance time of the RESCA subsystems function the 
probability of failure-free performance of the RESCA subsystem, 
the number of re-execution cycles of the BA operational units, the 
probability of switching to an alternative subsystem, etc.). 
Changing these parameters, one need to find the minimum value 
of the frequency of falling into emergency state – wmin(t) in the 
state of unsuccessful completion of the BA (steps 7, 8 and 9).  
The limiting conditions in this case are the minimum 
permissible limit of the task execution probability– Рlim(t), and the 
maximum permissible limit value of task execution duration – 
Tlim(t). If the safety characteristic w(t) takes the minimum value, 
and the Psp(t) ≥ Plim(t) (t) and Tsp≤ Tlim, then the obtained BA is 
safe. If this condition is not fulfilled, it is necessary to make 
changes in the BA and repeat all the above steps. Thus, the 
problem of finding the minimum value of the characteristics 
maximum of the BA is solved through a repeated change of the 
input data, which depends on the probability of the BA successful 
completion and its average duration.  
This problem is solved with the help of ASNA software [17], 
which constructs new graphs of states and transitions, forms the 
systems of Kolmogorov – Chapman differential equations, and 
solves them on the basis of the BA automatic structural model. 
Based on these solutions, the BA exploitation safety 
characteristics are calculated. The technique was tested through 
the algorithm for searching, detecting and capturing targets of the 
air monitoring radio electronic system. 
3. Conclusion 
The application of the exploitation safety characteristics w(t) 
of the behavior algorithm made it possible to assess the impact of 
the induced time redundancy on the efficiency indexes of the radio 
electronic systems for critical applications.  
We can estimate the frequency of behavior algorithm falling 
into the states of unsuccessful execution. The developed 
technique, then, allows system designers to minimize the 
frequency of behavior algorithm failures performing multivariate 
analysis considering both the configuration of the behavior 
algorithm and the hardware parameters of subsystems of complex 
technical system. 
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